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From Time to Time 
Auto-Affection in Derrida’s 1964-65 Heidegger Course 
Tracy Colony 
Bard College Berlin 
L’énigme est toujours celle de la temporalisation…1 
Derrida always stressed the importance of his engagement with 
Heidegger and often returned throughout his life to different aspects of 
Heidegger’s thought.2 With the recent publication of his 1964-65 course, 
Heidegger: The Question of Being and History3 greater insight is now possible 
into the exact terms of Derrida’s early engagement with Heidegger and the 
significance he would accord it in the seminal works of 1967 and beyond.4 It 
is well known that Derrida was familiar with Heidegger from the beginning 
and references to Heidegger appear in his first publications. Derrida’s early 
treatment of Heidegger in the courses he gave at the Sorbonne from 1960-64 
and such texts as “Violence and Metaphysics” first published in 1964 all 
indicate Heidegger’s clear and increasing importance in this period.5 
However, the appearance of Derrida’s 1964-65 course makes possible for the 
first time an appreciation of the intricate and singular dynamics of this 
encounter. After four years teaching as an assistant at the Sorbonne, this was 
the first course that Derrida delivered in his new position at the École normale 
supérieure. Meeting every other week from November 1964 to late March 1965 
Derrida’s course is comprised of nine sessions. The publication of this course 
is based upon the material Derrida prepared in the form of detailed lecture 
notes which have been exactingly edited and masterfully translated. With the 
reception of this work just beginning, many directions of questioning are 
being unfolded.6 However, one aspect not yet addressed in this early 
reception which will be crucial for approaching and orienting this text is the 
theme of auto-affection.  
The concept of auto-affection is important for assessing Derrida’s 
Heidegger course for two reasons. Firstly, Derrida understands auto-affection 
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to be Heidegger’s most radical figuration of temporality in the period of Being 
and Time. Secondly, tracing Derrida’s early focus on auto-affection in 
Heidegger can provide an important context for understanding the initial 
development of what would become a prominent theme in Derrida’s own 
work.7 Derrida’s understanding of auto-affection as the most original 
configuration of temporality in Heidegger’s thought during the composition 
of Being and Time and also a concept that was key in his movement beyond 
fundamental ontology is initially curious in that the term auto-affection 
[Selbstaffektion] does not appear in Being and Time. For Derrida, the importance 
of this term in the period of Being and Time derives from the understanding of 
temporality that Heidegger arrived at in the context of his reading of Kant. 
The text which is the basis for Derrida’s account of Heidegger’s 
understanding of temporality as auto-affection is his 1929 book Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics.8  
Derrida’s emphasis on Heidegger’s Kantbuch, which he will describe in 
1968 as a book that “envelops”9 Being and Time, is based on the fact 
Heidegger’s reading of Kant was to constitute the first division of the second 
part of Being and Time. However, Derrida also points to the fact that the 
material for Heidegger’s Kantbuch was presented in a lecture course 
immediately preceding Being and Time: “the essential content of this book was 
presented in lectures in 1925-26 – and so not long before the writing of Sein 
und Zeit.”10 In a translator’s note Geoffrey Bennington corrects Derrida’s dates 
pointing to the fact that Heidegger referred instead to his 1927-28 lecture 
course on Kant as the first elaboration of what was essential in the Kantbuch. 
However, Derrida is also correct in that although it was only published in 
German in 1976, Heidegger’s 1925-26 lecture course Logic: The Question of 
Truth11 contains over one hundred pages devoted to a phenomenological 
reading of time in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason which culminates in an 
interpretation of time as “original pure self-affection.”12 Moreover, the 
argument and focus of these pages exactly prefigures those in the later lecture 
course and the Kantbuch. In 1968 Derrida would again refer to this early 
lecture course as foreshadowing the Kantbuch which he describes as: “A result 
of the lectures given in 1925-26, it was also to correspond, in its content, with 
the second, unpublished part of Sein und Zeit.”13 While Heidegger’s 
engagements with Kant chronologically frame the project of Being and Time, 
for Derrida, the importance of this context derives firstly from Heidegger’s 
insights regarding the auto-affection of temporality that arose in this 
encounter.14               
Derrida first refers to the “auto-affection of time by itself”15 in Session 7 
of his course. The context for this reference is the description of resoluteness 
[Entschlossenheit] and authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] as dissimulating a more 
original passivity in Dasein, the signification of which Heidegger had already 
“recognized at the outset.”16 Earlier than the metaphysics of subjectivity still 
present in the themes of Entschlossenheit and Eigentlichkeit, Derrida finds in 
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Heidegger’s understanding of the auto-affection of time a more radical figure 
of passivity and finitude at the heart of existence. This figure of auto-affection 
which opens exactly within temporalization and which Derrida understands 
as obfuscated by Heidegger’s privileging of ethico-metaphysical senses of the 
future, death and freedom, is also seen by Derrida as what would open the 
way for Heidegger’s turn beyond the residual elements of a free subject in 
Being and Time. The point in Derrida’s reading where auto-affection is drawn 
together with Being and Time is Heidegger’s concept of Sichüberlieferung which 
Derrida translates as “auto-tradition” and articulates as: “a complementary 
concept or, if you prefer, the other side of the concept of pure auto-affection that 
describes time in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. And if we could do so, 
this is the book we would need to delve into here. Auto-affection and auto-
tradition – such is the movement of the temporalization of time.”17 The 
examination of Derrida’s understanding of this composition can shed 
considerable light not only on Derrida’s engagement with Being and Time but 
also on the development of his own thought. My argumentation in this essay 
is structured in three sections.  
In the first section, I present a brief introduction to Derrida’s course in 
terms of the theme of temporality. This theme can be seen as a principal motif 
through which Derrida traces the way in which Being and Time both points 
beyond, and yet, ultimately remains within the epoch of metaphysics that it 
brings to light. In the second section, I then draw out Derrida’s treatment of 
the auto-affection of time in this course. While many accounts of Derrida’s 
early relation to Heidegger have focused on the ontological difference, the 
significance that Derrida accorded Heidegger’s repetition [Wiederholung] of 
Kant on the auto-affection of time has gone relatively unnoticed. The new 
material which this course provides can help elaborate this important aspect 
of Derrida’s early Heidegger reception. In the final section, I conclude with a 
suggestion for better understanding Derrida’s references to Heidegger on the 
auto-affection of time in his 1967 work Voice and Phenomenon.  
I. 
 Derrida opens his course by describing the reasons behind his decision 
to entitle it “Heidegger: The Question of Being and History.” While many 
contemporary readings of Being and Time in this early stage of its French 
reception were content to simply present it as a work of phenomenology in 
the service of ontology, Derrida’s title explicitly announces a move beyond 
this common framing. Rather than a work of ontology, Derrida will unfold 
his reading of Being and Time within the dimension of the question of being 
that it more originally provokes. Although the term ontology is still 
functioning in a positive sense in Being and Time and its questioning is guided 
by the thematics of a fundamental ontology, Derrida stresses that this is not 
its ultimate scope. Rather than just the uncovering of a more original sense of 
ontology, what Heidegger is carrying out in this work is a destruction of the 
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history of ontology that is also a destruction of ontology itself. One of the 
remarkable virtues of Derrida’s early reception of Being and Time is that he 
reads it continually in relation to Heidegger’s later works and approaches it 
not as an incomplete or abandoned project, but rather, unfolds it in relation to 
the questionability of being that it evokes and that articulated the need to pass 
beyond its own initial formulations. The guiding role that Derrida accords the 
question of the truth of being is the basis from which he interprets the 
significance of such crucial terms as destruction, ontology and perhaps most 
importantly for this course, history itself. 
 In Session 2 Derrida poses the central question: “How then do matters 
stand between the question of being and history?”18 After tracing Heidegger’s 
announced departure from a prosaic sense of historicity which would attempt 
to explain the origin of beings by simply referring to another being, Derrida 
articulates a more original relatedness between the question of being and 
history. However, Derrida is very clear that the historicity of the truth of being 
itself is not explicitly raised within the scope of Being and Time and that it 
examines only the historicity of Dasein. In Being and Time the historicity of 
being itself must first pass through the question of the historicity of Dasein. 
Derrida describes this sense of historicity which remains within a 
hermeneutic of Dasein in terms of two “assurances.” These two assurances 
which Heidegger accords himself in posing the question of being, and which 
bring to light the historical character of that question, are both given in the 
form of an always already [toujours déjà]. This relatedness to a past forms the 
common root of both assurances and marks the implicit historicity of the 
question of being which then must be made explicit through the analytic of 
Dasein. 
The first of these assurances is that the meaning of being is always 
already in a sense available to Dasein. Dasein already finds itself within a pre-
understanding of the meaning of being. This familiarity with being, within 
which Dasein already moves and which provides an initial orientation for 
questioning, is taken by Heidegger as a fact [Faktum]. This first assurance is 
understood as the fact of language in that the meaning of the word is (to be) 
in any language is of necessity already understood. This ontological 
understanding already implicit and assumed in language is also tied to 
history in that there is no language without history. The second assurance 
with respect to posing the question of being is the projection of an absolute 
proximity of Dasein to the meaning of being. The privileged example of a 
being from which to pose the question of being is taken to be Dasein in its 
ability to question: “Nothing is closer to the question than the being that is 
questioning.”19 However, for Derrida, this absolute proximity of the character 
of Dasein as a questioning being to the meaning of being itself is also based 
upon Dasein’s proximity to itself.  
This other figure of proximity is announced in Heidegger’s description 
of Dasein as: “This being, which we ourselves in each case are and which 
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includes inquiry among the possibilities of its being […].”20 For Derrida: “This 
is where the second assurance is taken out. This is what I will call the Faktum 
of the we are.”21 This figure of proximity does not designate any already 
determined group or predicates, but rather, only articulates Dasein in terms 
of its proximity to the question of the meaning of being. In being close to the 
question of being we are close to what we ourselves are. This logic of 
proximity which will also structure Heidegger’s many later invocations of 
nearness [Nähe] will be one of the most important points of engagement in 
Derrida’s reception and deconstruction of Heidegger’s thought. After the 
presentation of the historicity implied in the two assurances, Derrida then 
turns to the way in which this theme of historicity is located within the 
architectonics of Being and Time. 
The topic of historicity appears in two places in Being and Time. First, it is 
cursorily announced in §6 of the Introduction and then treated more 
extensively in Chapter 5 of Division 2 entitled: “Temporality and 
Historicality.” For Derrida, this configuration represents the fact that within 
the methodological ordering of Being and Time: “The problem of historicity is 
grafted onto that of temporality.”22 This figuration of the relation between 
historicity and temporality in terms of a graft [greffe] is explicitly deployed by 
Derrida to indicate firstly that historicity is not simply the same as 
temporality. However, historicity is also something that, although different, 
can only be understood in terms of its rootedness in the movement of 
temporality. This rootedness of history in Dasein’s temporality is already 
announced in §6 of the Introduction where temporality is described as the 
condition of possibility for historicity. For Derrida, this grafting of history 
onto temporality renders historicity simply a mode of temporality which is 
modified and modalized merely in terms of the structures of temporalization 
itself. This is not to say that historicity demands to be conceived as purely 
independent from the temporality of Dasein which would in effect invite the 
resurgence of the most prosaic metaphysics. Rather, what is lacking are 
original concepts which could both articulate their relatedness, and yet, still 
distinguish historicity from Dasein’s temporality. 
The danger Derrida finds in grafting history onto the temporality of 
Dasein is that what is rooted loses its ability to differentiate itself from the root 
and becomes simply indistinguishable from the movement of temporality: 
“There is here an irreducible elementary structural nucleus within which the 
movement of the Geschehen appears to be isomorphic with the movement of 
temporality.”23 This absorption of history into temporality and the absence of 
new concepts for articulating history beyond this temporal ground are the 
reasons for Derrida’s account of a certain “running out of breath” 
[essoufflement] in the final sections of Being and Time. This theme of running 
out of breath is one that Derrida refers to throughout his course to describe 
the ending of Being and Time that was both the encountering of a limit and the 
articulation of a need to turn beyond its projected structure.24 These two 
T r a c y  C o l o n y  |  1 9  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 1 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.876 
reasons are then traced to a common source which is the understanding of 
time as the transcendental horizon for approaching both the meanings of 
history and being. This privileging of time as the fundamental hermeneutic 
clue for posing the question of being was a presupposition which held the 
project of Being and Time firmly in the grasp of metaphysics. However, Derrida 
also clearly articulates ways in which Heidegger’s early phenomenology of 
temporality can be seen to differentiate itself from the traditional metaphysics 
of presence which extended from Plato to Husserl. The basis for this advance 
is Heidegger’s understanding of temporality beyond the logic of absolute 
presence, and rather, as a figure of ecstasis. 
One of the most important themes through which Derrida traces 
Heidegger’s departure from traditional metaphysics, most often exemplified 
in this course by Husserl, is the meaning accorded to the present: “Everything 
– everything: that is, not only this or that gesture of the destruction of 
Metaphysics but the totality of the destruction and the meaning that directs it 
as a whole – everything is played out around the meaning of the Present.”25 
For Derrida, Husserl remains a metaphysician of presence in that the present 
is the unquestioned ground of identity, philosophical meaning and the 
ultimate foundation for the movement of temporality. The dimensionality of 
time is thought on the basis of the pure presence of the present to itself. The 
future is thought as a coming future present and the past as a past present. In 
Heidegger, Derrida finds the articulation of a more original extension 
[Erstreckung] of temporality. Instead of reducing the extendedness of life from 
birth to death in an absolute present, Heidegger thinks presence itself as 
determined from out of this more original ecstasis. Dasein’s relatedness to 
birth and death are exactly constitutive of Dasein: “Dasein is its past and is its 
future, is its birth and its death. But the is [est] here designates a Being that 
can absolutely not have the form of presence or phenomenality.”26 While 
Derrida unfolds the implications of Heidegger’s shift in thinking ecstasis and 
not presence as the fundamental origin of temporality, there remains within 
Heidegger’s privileging of the future a residual form of metaphysics that, 
despite its advances, rendered Being and Time fundamentally continuous with 
that tradition. 
The ultimate source of temporality which opens the ecstatic structure of 
Dasein is the indeterminate character of death. Rather than a contingent event 
which would at some point become present, Derrida reads this indeterminacy 
of death as opening the ecstasis of the future from out of which the present 
itself is configured. This rethinking of presence as determined by the ecstatic 
horizon of the future is described by Derrida as constituting: “the present as 
the past of a future.”27 This expression, which Derrida often repeats, may not 
be taken in any chronological sense as merely indicating the ordering of the 
present behind a not yet present future. Rather, it points to a more original 
complicity of past and future in the determination of presence. However, 
within this relation, the ecstasis of the future is clearly privileged to such a 
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degree that Derrida simply says that Heidegger: “substitutes – as he always 
does in Sein und Zeit – the privileging of the future for that of the present.”28 
Rather than thinking the present as the ground for the movement of 
temporalization, Derrida reads in Heidegger: “the future as presentifying 
itself as temporalization of temporality.”29 In this shift to think the present 
from out of the ecstasy of the future Derrida finds Heidegger “illegitimately 
privileging here the ekstasis of the future – and this is consistent with the 
privileging of Entschlossenheit and the finite horizon of death.”30 However, it 
is at this point, where temporality in Being and Time is enclosed within this 
privileging of the future, and all its attending pathos of resolution, that 
Derrida will first introduce the theme of the auto-affection of time. 
Derrida introduces the auto-affection of time almost as an unexpressed 
resource located just behind the explicit contours of Being and Time. Referring 
back to auto-affection from the edges of Being and Time brings into relief the 
limits of that text via a passivity in Dasein that is more original than the 
“metaphysics of proper (eigentlich) subjectivity”31 still present in the structure 
of resoluteness.  
[I]t is a certain irreducible passivity of ek-sistence and Da-
sein. Passivity, nucleus of passivity, which must not be 
understood on the model of thingly intra-worldliness or as 
sensibility, but at the very least as auto-affection of time by 
itself. Now it is this originary passivity that Entschlossenheit 
runs the risk of dissimulating and, having recognized at the 
outset the signification of this passivity of being in history 
(comprehended in history) or of being in the world, 
Heidegger was bound to seek further than Eigentlichkeit 
and Entschlossenheit.32  
Derrida will then immediately clarify Eigentlichkeit as “proper, i.e., close to 
oneself”33 so that the logic of proximity which has guaranteed the 
hermeneutic privilege of Dasein is also brought into question through the 
passivity announced by the auto-affection of time. I turn now to draw out the 
way in which Derrida can be seen to read Being and Time against the 
background of what he considered to be Heidegger’s more original 
understanding of temporality in the thought of auto-affection. 
II.       
Derrida’s first reference to an originary sense of affectivity underlying 
the concepts of authenticity, being-towards-death and anxiety comes in 
Session 6 where, referring to these central themes, he laments his course will 
have to skip over many sections of Being and Time but that:  
We should especially have to give back their true meaning 
to the analyses of world and time and wrest them from the 
mist of romantic pathos in which they have been 
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enveloped. I say “enveloped,” as with a rich coat that 
would hide the skeletal body of a philosophical intention, 
whereas if pathos there be – and there is – it hangs on an 
ontological re-understanding of affectivity, which is no 
longer being understood by way of metaphysics as an 
accident of sensibility foreign to reason, and so on.34                             
This true meaning of the world and time, understood in terms of an affectivity 
interpreted beyond its traditional determinations, can be seen as a reference 
to Heidegger’s treatment of the auto-affection of time in Kant and the Problem 
of Metaphysics. In this text Heidegger charts the way in which Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason points toward a more original sense of time than what was 
explicitly presented in the transcendental aesthetic. This more original sense, 
which is brought to light via Heidegger’s own phenomenologically clarified 
temporality, defines the fundamental structure of transcendence in the 
Kantian subject. Heidegger’s reading also uncovers the most extreme index of 
finitude at the center of this temporality in what he describes as “taking-in-
stride” [Hinnehmen].   
Time as a form of intuition does not create what it intuits, but rather, must 
take-in-stride and receive what gives itself. However, the pure form of 
intuition is different in that: “Pure intuition, in the taking-in-stride, gives itself 
that which is capable of being taken in stride.”35 Although it is beyond the 
scope of this essay to present Heidegger’s account of auto-affection in his 
Kantbuch, I will briefly focus on this figure of taking-in-stride because it looks 
forward to the sense of passivity in Derrida’s reading. This sense of taking-in-
stride is for Heidegger both formative and receptive. Formative in the sense 
that it gives a possible pre-view or image to time and also receptive in that for 
pure intuition what it intuits is time itself. This giving form to time is 
understood to be the operation of the transcendental imagination; however, 
this is not simply a static transcendental form, but rather, it too is 
characterized by a receptive relation to its own intuition of time. This figure 
of passivity and finitude is the basis for Heidegger’s description of auto-
affection at the heart of time: “Pure taking-in-stride, however, means: 
becoming affected in the absence of experience, i.e., self-affecting. Time as 
pure self-affection is that finite, pure intuition which bears and makes possible 
in general the pure concept (the understanding) that stands in essential 
service to intuition. The idea of pure self-affection […] determines the 
innermost essence of transcendence.”36 In pure intuition, time itself is 
constituted by its passive reception of itself. This sense of affection is not an 
event that a transcendental subject would simply undergo, but rather, what 
first makes possible the synthesis of time into a specific horizon or form. This 
original differing within the pure auto-affection of time, that opens the 
possibility of the temporalization of time, announces the radical sense of 
passivity that Derrida will develop in his course.37         
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The concept in Being and Time that Derrida reads in relation to the auto-
affection of time is Sichüberlieferung which he translates as “auto-tradition.” In 
spite of Heidegger’s consistent reduction of history to temporality, the one 
concept which Derrida finds that somewhat indicates a new vocabulary for 
historicity is Sichüberlieferung. This term describes the originary synthesis of 
temporality that first opens the possibility of historicity: “This 
Sichüberlieferung, this passage from self to self that constitutes the nuclear 
synthesis of historicity and is, properly speaking, the first tissue, the first text 
[…].”38 The sense of auto-transmission in this term may not be understood at 
the level of any intra-temporal or merely empirical meaning,  but rather, must 
be seen as the synthesis that first opens the possibility of historicity as such. 
Earlier than either remembering or forgetting, the synthesis that makes 
possible this passage from self to self must already be in place. Strictly 
speaking, the movement of temporalization which makes possible the 
handing down of an authentically repeated possibility is itself earlier than the 
self or autos which would seem to preceed it. However, the most important 
aspect of this synthesis of past and present from out of the ecstasy of the future 
is its deeper character as auto-affection. This other side of auto-tradition opens 
an earlier difference within this seemingly original continuity of ecstatic 
temporality. The difference which opens within the pure auto-affection of 
time is seen to determine this movement of temporalization and draw into 
question its status as an apparently discreet and unitary medium for self-
relation.  
As a synthesis of Dasein’s ecstatic temporality, the auto-transmission of 
a past possibility projected from out of Dasein’s futurity initially seems to be 
enclosed within Entschlossenheit understood as the attribute of a free subject: 
“This first tissue, this first text is authentically historical only if it is 
constituted, I would almost say written on the basis of an Entschlossenheit, a 
resolute anticipation and a freedom for death.”39 However, Derrida also 
stresses that Entschlossenheit may not be simply defined within the horizon of 
morality or psychology. Prior to the ethico-metaphysical resolution of a free 
subject Derrida also describes an earlier auto-traditionality of Entschlossenheit 
itself as the primary condition of authentic historicity. And yet, the way 
Derrida brings together auto-affection and Sichüberlieferung will exactly draw 
into question the meaning of auto-tradition as a movement which would 
simply supervene upon an already given unity of self. What is properly at 
issue is the very continuity of the passage from self to self in auto-tradition 
which Derrida describes as the first tissue or text. While this auto-
transmission of self to self is described as the first tissue, because it is made 
possible by a movement of temporal synthesis which is itself more originally 
determined by auto-affection, it cannot be understood as an originally 
homogeneous medium. Earlier than the seemingly original continuity of this 
first text is the constitutive difference within the pure auto-affection of time.          
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Derrida clearly understands the figure of auto-affection as the more 
original term in the relation between auto-affection and auto-tradition: “time, 
precisely, of which auto-affection is the name.”40 This priority is expressed in 
different ways throughout his course. Initially, he describes Sichüberlieferung 
as a “complementary concept”41 of the pure auto-affection of time and as “the 
other side [l’autre face] of the concept of pure auto-affection.”42 Sichüberlieferung 
is then later described as “another name for the auto-affection of pure time”43 
and as “the general structure of temporality as auto-affection.”44 Although 
Derrida draws together both of these terms: “Auto-affection and auto-
tradition – such is the movement of the temporalization of time.”45 it is the 
constitutive role that Derrida accords the aspect of differing within the auto-
affection of time that is the basis for this priority. In Heidegger’s repetition of 
Kant the auto-affection of time is seen to uncover an instance of difference 
within the temporalization of time that is constitutive of both prosaic presence 
and ecstatic temporality. This difference which Derrida finds in Heidegger’s 
thought of auto-affection is key for articulating Derrida’s understanding of 
the way in which Heidegger diverges from Husserl’s account of 
temporalization. Whereas Derrida will repeatedly describe Heidegger’s 
thought as ultimately “analogous”46 to Husserl in terms of substituting the 
present with the future, and presence with ecstasis, this determination is 
never applied to the figure of auto-affection.     
On Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s repetition of Kant, the auto-affection 
of time is not the reception of an already given being that is external to a 
subject. Nor is it, as in Kant’s account of the phenomenalization of a being that 
I have not created, an intuitus derivativus. It is not the affection of a subject by 
any empirical externality because, strictly speaking, time is neither something 
outside nor a being. This reception does not transpire within an already 
thematized temporal form or subjectivity, but rather, is a figure of differing 
that opens the possibility of the temporalization of time itself. This earlier 
alterity opens the possibility of the synthesis of temporality whether 
understood on the basis of the present or from out of the ecstasy of Dasein’s 
future. As pure auto-affection the movement of temporalization is first 
opened by the otherness of time to itself. Derrida describes auto-affection as 
a concept that is “as incomprehensible as is, in truth, the movement of 
temporalization.”47 This enigma which does not simply befall any more 
original unity of self is a differing which first opens and remains constitutive 
of all thematizations of self-relation. It is perhaps from this perspective that 
Derrida allows the auto-affection of time to envelop the whole of Being and 
Time and point beyond it. 
For Derrida, the thought of auto-affection is able to articulate the earliest 
ecstatic structure of Dasein’s transcendence. Auto-affection thus defines time 
as the transcendental horizon for the question of being and also, 
simultaneously, indicated a way beyond the lingering metaphysics of 
subjectivity which also still determined that horizon: “You know that this 
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theme of pure auto-affection is merely the opening in Heidegger’s thought to 
the theme of the transcendence of Dasein and to the question of being, beyond 
the metaphysics of subjectivity.”48 Affectivity is seen to figure the 
transcendence of Dasein and, as such, open beyond any traditional 
thematization of subjectivity. At this point Derrida explicitly contrasts 
Heidegger’s sense of affectivity as transcendence with the contemporaneous 
treatment of this theme in Michel Henry’s The Essence of Manifestation which 
appeared in 1963.49 In this work there is also an appeal to an originary sense 
of affection. For Henry, all previous phenomenological accounts of 
manifestation in terms of intentionality or ecstatic temporality had 
overlooked an earlier moment of transcendental affectivity in which there is 
ultimately no division between what appears and the one to whom it appears. 
Rather than moving beyond subjectivity, as in Derrida’s reading of auto-
affection in Heidegger, there is in Henry an equation of affectivity with pure 
subjectivity and pure self-coincidence which he thought was merely 
dissimulated in the previous phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. 
This is perhaps the reason for Derrida’s, rather undissimulated, description 
of Henry’s book as: “totally pointless in its result.”50   
Derrida’s contrast between Henry’s appeal to “affectivity as pure 
subjectivity, without transcendence outside itself”51 and Heidegger’s sense of 
affection which opens beyond the metaphysics of subjectivity is instructive. 
In contrast to Henry’s supposed uncovering of a pure subjectivity, the figure 
of auto-affection in Heidegger is more radical in that it can be seen to think 
the auto not as an original unity, but as itself constituted by an earlier division 
and differing. This sense of constitutive deferral within auto-affection can be 
seen as what Derrida describes as the deeper character or “other side” of 
Sichüberlieferung in Being and Time. This position of auto-affection as the other 
side of auto-tradition is announced as the most immediate reason for his 
“detour” through Heidegger’s repetition of Kant. Referring to the Kantbuch 
Derrida presents the following passage in both French and then the original 
German:   
According to its essence, time is pure affection of itself. 
Furthermore, it is precisely what in general forms seeing 
which, setting off from itself, heads for something like the 
“from-out-itself-toward-there …,” so that the upon-which 
looks back and into the previously named toward-there.52  
In this quotation Heidegger is describing originary time from which the 
derivative thematization of time as a sequence of nows arises and then relates 
back to. Stressing the ecstatic figuration of this departure, which however still 
remains a conservation of self, Derrida immediately comments on this 
quotation: “Well, this exiting from self that rebounds onto self and holds itself 
in the exit from self, gives itself and transmits itself so as to keep it, its own 
ekstatic movement, in itself, and that is auto-transmission […].”53 Derrida 
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clearly emphasizes that the form of this self-keeping is not grounded in the 
present, but rather, must be understood as an ecstatic figure of repose. 
 Derrida’s reading of auto-transmission is not to be understood as the 
handing down of any specific ontic content from self to self, but rather, as the 
“pure, a priori, non-empirical”54 condition of the possibility of traditionality as 
such. This movement of auto-tradition is not the transmission of possibilities 
within an already constituted subject, but instead, the most originary 
synthesis of ecstatic temporality that opens the possibility of historicity itself. 
Derrida is very explicit that this transmission of self to self is not held in a 
present but is thought on the basis of temporality as an ecstatic movement. 
However, this ecstatic repose of the self is a continuity that is opened by a still 
more original division within time itself. Derrida indicates the scope of this 
difference within pure auto-affection as the other side of auto-tradition at the 
opening of the final session: “The notion of Sichüberlieferung which at least in 
name presented itself as original, referred us to the theme of time as the other 
[temps comme l’autre], pure affection […].”55 This sense of alterity within the 
relation of time to itself, is not simply an interval between thematized units of 
time, but rather, an earlier difference that first makes these articulations 
possible. Earlier than any apparently original continuity of a temporal 
medium, whether as the self-presence of the present or ecstatic temporality 
opened and unified from out of Dasein’s future, this seemingly pure 
continuity is opened by a more radical dis-continuity. This figure of difference 
within auto-affection is returned to in the final moments of the course and 
read beyond the orders of history and being itself. 
 Derrida’s final reference to auto-affection comes at the very conclusion 
of his course when he steps back from the question of historicity within Being 
and Time and poses the wider question of the historicity of being as such. The 
thought of auto-affection has already been articulated as crucial for 
Heidegger’s turn from historicity grafted onto the temporality of Dasein to 
the history of being itself. This final reference to auto-affection is presented in 
terms of the destruction of both history and being. Beyond the horizon of 
Being and Time, these terms are rethought as metaphors which are undergoing 
destruction: “the signification history is also, like that of Being, a metaphor to 
be destroyed.”56 This sense of metaphor is not simply a rhetorical trope but 
describes an interminable condition of displacement in relation to the proper 
as the truth of being. This destruction is not a philosophical gesture because 
the question of being as history has itself been brought about by the 
destruction of philosophy. 
The sense of destruction which history and being are undergoing is 
described as a destruction which overflows these very terms: “It is 
accomplished slowly, patiently, it patiently takes hold of the whole of 
language, of science, of the human, of the world. And this patience is not even 
ours, it is not an ethical virtue. It is the auto-affection of what one can no 
longer even call being.”57 With this image of history and being as metaphors 
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being destroyed Derrida returns to his initial elaboration of the title which 
guided his course. Both of these destructions are described as generating 
another metaphor, that of the future itself behind which is the opening of the 
question itself which he then describes as difference. These depictions can 
perhaps shed some light on Derrida’s later account of the incessant necessity 
of passing through the erased determination of the ontological difference and 
the truth of being.58 Although in the final moments of his course the theme of 
auto-affection is allowed to indicate beyond being, perhaps the most 
important aspect of Derrida’s reading of the auto-affection of time in this 
course is his uncovering of a constitutive difference in Heidegger’s early 
understanding of the temporalization of time.    
The passivity Derrida finds at the basis of Dasein which was dissimulated 
by the privileged ecstasy of the future, is a more fundamental passivity within 
the movement of the temporalization of time itself. For Derrida, the point of 
questioning was not the figure of auto-affection as such. Rather, auto-affection 
will soon be seen as a minimal condition of experience itself and will be 
described in Of Grammatology as a “universal structure of experience.”59 The 
capacity for auto-affection will also soon be seen as a minimal condition of life 
as such. Rather, what Derrida will question in Heidegger and beyond is the 
interpretation of auto-affection as offering a moment of unmediated pure 
presence of self to self. The metaphysical promise of pure self-presence is 
always an obfuscation of the earlier condition of time as itself divided via a 
heterogeneous element. It is this more original instance of difference that 
opens the apparently pure continuity of the present which seemed to offer the 
possibility of an unmediated relation of self to self. Understanding Heidegger 
as articulating an alterity within time which determines the synthetic unity of 
ecstatic temporality can be seen as a crucial, and largely overlooked, aspect in 
Derrida’s early reception of Heidegger’s thought. However, this difference 
which opens within the pure auto-affection of time in his reading of 
Heidegger, is not to be seen in terms of the radical sense of heteronomy that 
Derrida will later describe as at the heart of all auto-affection.  
In the difference that opens within Heidegger’s auto-affection of time 
there is no properly heteronomous element such as space, the body, or the 
world. Rather, this sense of passivity and alterity remained thought solely 
within the alterity of time as the other to itself. Although opening a 
constitutive difference, it remains thought within the order of time and, like 
Derrida’s later readings of auto-affection, also can be seen to dissimulate a 
deeper unthought character of time as more originally a relation of hetero-
affection. However, the importance that Derrida accorded Heidegger’s 
uncovering of a constitutive difference at the heart of temporalization is 
announced at the end of this course. Thinking the unity of ecstatic temporality 
against the background of temporalization as both auto-tradition and auto-
affection locates what Derrida describes as an enigma that announces a future 
task: “This is the enigma that remains to be thought; this is the question that 
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remains to be questioned.”60 In many ways, it is this task of thinking the 
implications of an alterity within temporalization that can be seen to look 
forward to Derrida’s employment of auto-affection in his reading of Husserl 
in Voice and Phenomenon. I turn now to Derrida’s treatment of the auto-
affection of time in that work in light of his earlier development of this theme 
in Heidegger.  
III. 
 Derrida’s seminal text Voice and Phenomenon originally appeared in 
1967. The explicit theme of this work is Husserl’s understanding of signs, 
however, in effect, this text draws into question the entire project of 
phenomenology as such. The focus of this deconstruction which exposes an 
unthought metaphysics in phenomenology is Husserl’s treatment of the 
temporal ground of the voice. The figure of auto-affection is first employed to 
describe Husserl’s account of the voice which seems to be an instance of pure 
transmission from self to self. On Derrida’s reading, the unity of 
consciousness, the understanding of the pure presentation of phenomena in 
the present, is assumed by Husserl to be founded in the living voice [la vive 
voix]. This phenomenological voice is at once what conserves the self-identity 
of consciousness and which is able to reduce all aspects of difference within 
language. This living voice is not the sonorous physical voice, but rather, the 
transcendental unity of life in its full presence to itself. Derrida describes this 
apparently pure interiority of the voice that can speak and hear itself without 
having to pass through any exteriority as auto-affection: “The operation of 
‘hearing oneself speak’ is an auto-affection of a unique kind.”61 For Husserl, 
what makes possible this pure transmission is that it takes place within the 
same moment [im selben Augenblick]. The basis of this absolute self-proximity 
is the identity of the present. It is this purity of the present that Derrida will 
draw into question by once again deploying the figure of auto-affection at the 
heart of temporalization.  
 On Husserl’s understanding, what guarantees the pure interiority and 
absolute self-proximity of the voice which hears itself is that it is held in the 
perfectly diaphaneous medium of the living present. Exactly because Husserl 
grounds the absolute self-proximity of the voice in the purely temporal core 
of the living present Derrida describes the concept of auto-affection as 
“incumbent [imposé] on us.”62 This privileging of the present, which is the 
basis of all temporalization in Husserl, will be shown by Derrida to actually 
dissimulate an earlier figure of difference within temporalization thought 
more originally as pure auto-affection. Derrida describes this necessity of 
thinking the movement of temporalization in terms of auto-affection as 
already articulated by Heidegger. 
As soon as one takes the movement of temporalization into 
account, as it is already analyzed in The Phenomenology of 
Internal Time-Consciousness, the concept of pure auto-
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affection must be employed as well. This we know is what 
Heidegger does in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
precisely when he is concerned with the subject of time.63    
Initially, this reference to Heidegger’s reading of auto-affection in Kant 
seems to be introduced as a passing historical note. However, in light of the 
importance it was accorded in the Heidegger course, as a difference more 
original than the ecstatic temporalization of temporality in Being and Time, 
Derrida’s reference to Heidegger can be granted a greater significance. 
Moreover, this drawing together of pure auto-affection and the movement of 
temporalization is significant in that it was exactly the movement of 
temporalization that Derrida announced as the point where: 
“phenomenology seems to us tormented, if not contested from within.”64 This 
articulation of the movement of temporalization in terms of pure auto-
affection is clearly symmetrical to Derrida’s employment of Heidegger’s 
figuration of auto-affection in his reading of Being and Time. This sense of re-
appropriation, perhaps one could even say of Wiederholung on Derrida’s part, 
in which Heidegger is both proximated and then passed through, is suggested 
in two preceding references to Heidegger. 
 In his reading of Husserl’s treatment of signs, Derrida points to the fact 
that Husserl would seem to counter the traditional subjection of sign to truth 
and of language to being and in fact attempts to think the ways in which 
signification also conditions the concepts of truth and being. However, this 
rejection of naïve ontology and return to life as the active constitution of truth 
and being through its signs is critiqued by Heidegger as simply a reversal that 
preserves metaphysics. In an extended footnote, Derrida describes this 
critique as “one of the most enduring themes of Heidegger’s meditation,”65 
and in response to those readings of Heidegger which would bring charges of 
merely another metaphysical reversal, Derrida states: “We think on the 
contrary, without being able to go into it here, that no one before has better 
escaped them.”66 However, Derrida also later clarifies: “while we appeal to 
Heideggerian motifs in decisive places, we would especially like to raise the 
question whether, with respect to […] the pretended irreducibility of certain 
word unities (the unity of the word being or of other ‘radical words’), 
Heidegger’s thought does not sometimes raise the same questions as the 
metaphysics of presence.”67 While of course Heidegger’s word nostalgia 
marks the hold of metaphysics on his own thought, a key instance of Derrida’s 
appeal to Heideggerian themes at decisive places is the auto-affection of 
time.68 
 Throughout the Heidegger course as well as Voice and Phenomenon, 
Derrida consistently refers to the temporalization of time in Husserl as a 
modification of presence. Although Derrida’s reference to the “im selben 
Augenblick” is taken from the Logical Investigations this privilege of the present 
is also understood to characterize the more nuanced treatments of 
temporalization in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. In this 
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later text the present is seen to be continuously compounded with the 
nonpresence of primary memory and expectation such that it is not possible 
to speak of a “simple self-identity of the present.”69 And yet, there remains a 
temporal core, a source point, which is the foundation for the movement of 
temporalization. This movement remains a modification ultimately internal 
to presence. In many ways just as the ecstatic movement of temporality in the 
Heidegger course was an exit still held within the ecstasis of the future. As in 
the Heidegger course, it is exactly this apparent temporal unity which is then 
thought as already constituted by a difference opened by the pure auto-
affection of time. For Derrida, the source point of the moment in Husserl is 
already a site of time’s pure auto-affection. Earlier than the seeming ability of 
time to ground itself in its own pure interiority, is the difference that is opened 
by its auto-affection: “Is not the concept of pure solitude undermined by its 
own origin, by the very condition of its self-presence, that is, by “time,” to be 
conceived anew on the basis now of difference within auto-affection.”70 While 
this difference in Heidegger’s sense of auto-affection was still internal to a 
temporal or ontological determination, for Derrida, it will open upon a 
difference already in excess of these orders.  
 Derrida’s employment of Heidegger’s thought of the auto-affection of 
time in his reading of Being and Time, clearly looks forward to the way auto-
affection is also applied to Husserl’s account of temporalization in Voice and 
Phenomenon. In both texts, Heidegger’s thought of auto-affection functions as 
a first articulation of an internal difference within the seeming continuity of 
time. This can be seen in both the temporalization of time from out of the 
future in Being and Time and on the basis of the present in The Phenomenology 
of Internal Time-Consciousness. In both works, Derrida locates Heidegger’s 
thought of auto-affection as the initial articulation of an earlier alterity 
opening within time itself. From this perspective, Heidegger’s thought can be 
seen to also gesture towards an initial destabilization of the programs of 
phenomenology in both texts. However, while Heidegger’s sense of 
difference was thought only within the scope of time and being, the difference 
which opens within auto-affection in Voice and Phenomena of course overflows 
that initial Heideggerian figuration of alterity. As is well known, what it 
opened onto was a hetero-affection at the heart of “time” which was 
dissimulated by every assurance of pure auto-affection and approached solely 
in Derrida’s own thought of différance.   
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